Chapter 46, Argentinas Default of 2001

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Or, if you are already a subscriber Sign in. Close drawer menu Financial Times International Edition. Search the FT Search. World Show more World. US Show more US. Companies Show more Companies. Consent is also not required when the data is collected on private property—including spaces that are rented or leased. Article 2 stipulates that collected images may not be used for any other reason than the originally stated purpose.

The provision also establishes that images that are captured in violation of individuals rights must be purged upon request of the individual whose data was collected. Those in charge of collecting and managing digital images for purposes of security must implement a privacy and personal data management policy.

The policy must establish a retention period for images, and instructions for purging the data after the period has elapsed. Similar to the information obtained by drones, the databases that store personal data collected by security cameras must be registered with the National Registry of Data. The National Department of Personal Data establishes a guide of rules for the protection of personal data in the development of applications by enforcing privacy policies during app development.

The guide emphasizes that people have the right to control how their personal information is used. Section 2 references the principles of privacy and indicates that data management can only be legal if the data subject has given consent—unless, of course, one of the aforementioned exceptions provided for in the regulatory framework is applicable. This guide urges app developers to be transparent about how they use data and to build their apps with privacy by design and privacy by default in mind. It also urges them to establish clear privacy policies. Similar to the provisions mentioned above, this guide establishes that the collected data may only be used in accordance with the aim for which it was obtained.

Such data must be strictly relevant to the purpose that prompted its collection, and it may not be obtained via unfair or illegal means. Finally, the data must be destroyed when it becomes irrelevant. Modifications to the Telecommunications Law were passed in These articles were initially regulated by a decree, which was suspended a year later. Attorney Ernesto Halabi filed an amparo action, arguing that these three articles were unconstitutional on the grounds that they violated the right to privacy and made it impossible for him to guarantee his clients professional secrecy.

The case worked its way up to the Supreme Court which ultimately ruled that communications data transmitted by appropriate means is protected under personal privacy. Such communications data is covered by the constitutional provisions that protect privacy and establish the inviolability of home, and also by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man. The Supreme Court then maintained that intrusions into the private lives of individuals are only justified when they are provided for by law—and as long as there is a greater interest in protecting individual freedoms, social defense, public morals, or fighting crime.

The Court referenced prior judgments in which a breach of the inviolability of correspondence would have been acceptable:. The Court considered that the articles in question did not meet the above-mentioned requirements. The articles failed to describe the cases or circumstances in which interceptions could be conducted, and did not provide for a specific system that would protect communications. Argentina has adopted a federal-type government structure, which means more than one territorial center has the capacity to adopt laws.

The unity of the State is balanced by the plurality and autonomy of the provinces. Nonetheless, it establishes that, depending on the jurisdictions to which cases or individuals belong, either the federal or provincial courts are responsible for enforcing it. The goal is to maintain unity and consistency, and at the same time, respect the autonomy of each province to delineate procedural codes for the implementation of substantive law. This means that the Criminal Code is enacted by the National Congress and applied throughout the country.

Provinces cannot issue their own criminal codes, however procedural codes are promulgated by each jurisdiction. This makes it difficult to describe all of the actors and bodies involved in criminal prosecutions in Argentina and also to outline a procedural diagram for communications interception since both vary according to jurisdiction. Thus, we look to the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure as an example, which applies to crimes under federal jurisdiction, since many provincial regulations follow the regulations in the federal code.

Jurisdictional Bodies: Public Prosecutor's Office: The National Criminal Procedure Code establishes the following steps for communications interception:. It may occasionally request communications surveillance in connection with complex federal crimes related to terrorism, cybercrime, drugs, arms, and human trafficking, etc. It may also do so for crimes against economic and financial public order and crimes against public authorities and constitutional order.

It has its own means of collection. This process is explained further below. The AFI is the highest intelligence authority in Argentina and it controls the other agencies that make it up. According to the New Doctrine of National Intelligence, which is the recent legislation that provides for Law 27, and delineates issues related to intelligence, the AFI's functions are as follows:. In order to intercept private communications, the AFI must request judicial authorization.

The director general of the AFI, or another official shall request the judicial authorization from a federal judge with jurisdictional authority. The jurisdiction is defined according to the address of the person s whose communications are to be intercepted or by the place where they are held in the case of mobile or satellite communications. Authorization to intercept communications shall be granted for a period no longer than 60 days, which shall automatically lapse, unless the director or appointed official formally requests that the period be prolonged for an additional 60 days as long as it is absolutely required in order to complete the investigation.

Once these terms have lapsed, the judge shall initiate the appropriate proceedings or, alternatively, order the destruction of all the elements that were intercepted. When Law 27, was adopted, the former Department of Judicial Interceptions DOJ, in Spanish —which was the only State body in charge of conducting communications interceptions or seizures—was transferred to the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry an independent body that has operational and financial autonomy. Judicial orders for telephone communications interceptions were sent to the DICOM with precise instructions on how the interception should be conducted for example, which numbers should be intercepted.

Then, the DICOM would send the request to the telephone service provider in charge of diverting the communication. These new regulations transferred not only the operations to the Public Prosecutor's Office, but also all the computer databases and the previous agency's documents and information about prior-conducted interceptions. Pursuant to this decree, the Minister of Interior is responsible for criminal prosecutions and thus has a specific aim. So, in order to guarantee due process, the interception of communications should be ordered by a body that is independent from the criminal investigation process.

In this case, the decree establishes that such body must be the Supreme Court. The Acordada No. This decision sets forth some principles which, according to the Supreme Court, should guide the interception of communications:. The DCCPJ shall remain independent from the Supreme Court, and run by a general director—who shall be a criminal judge—for one year only. Moreover, the decision states that the DCCPJ shall have a board of directors, but it is unclear as to how these board members are to be elected.


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Two other bodies were created during this transfer: an advisory commission made up of experts in the field and an advisory council made up of civil society institutions and organizations in order to establish mechanisms to guarantee transparency and participation.

In the Court decision that created the DCCPJ, there is no reference to mechanisms by which civil society and academics could participate nor does it make reference to any external oversight proceedings. Taking these changes into account, the process for the interception of communications includes the following:. According to the legislation on crime and intelligence mentioned in previous sections, the interception of communications cannot be carried out without prior judicial authorization. There is no obligation to submit transparency reports as part of the criminal process related to communications interception.

In the intelligence process, intelligence agencies are compelled to submit annual confidential reports about their intelligence activities to the Bicameral Commission on the Supervision of Intelligence Bodies and their Activities. According to this law, the Commission shall, among other functions, supervise the various branches of the National Intelligence System, control their performance to ensure that they strictly follow legal and constitutional norms, and monitor intelligence activities.

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The Commission started operating in , when it was given the funds it needed to operate. Despite the fact that the request was submitted twice, the government has not yet responded. In February , it was revealed that the Commission had met to analyze the reform project for the Intelligence Law. As stated above, the resolution that created the DICOM also set up an advisory commission, made up of experts in the field.

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With the transfer of the power to intercept communications to the Supreme Court and the creation of the DCCPJ, no independent oversight mechanisms were established to guarantee transparency and accountability. However, as mentioned before, there are some aspects about this regulation that have yet to be defined by the Court. Both criminal and intelligence processes for communications surveillance lack procedures for deferred user notification. In the criminal process, only in cases where computer equipments are searched and seized are the affected notified. However, the user is never informed that their private communications were intercepted if said communications are not used in a criminal proceeding.

In the past few years, Argentina has gone through a series of situations related to the surveillance and interception of communications on public officials and journalists. For instance, in , a journalistic investigation publicly revealed that e-mails belonging to journalists and judges had been breached. Even though there have been several similar attempts to modify the Code in order to include such crimes, it was these specific revelations that triggered the implementation of this law, since the e-mail breach was not part of the Code back then.

This episode revealed loopholes in the Criminal Code for computer crimes, and soon after that the reform was passed. A Court decision holds Mr. The former chief of the Metropolitan Police of Buenos Aires has also been prosecuted and is awaiting trial in the same court case.

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This data collection violates the aforementioned legal framework and was not authorized by a judge. In addition, the activities were not reported to the Bicameral Commission, the agency in charge of monitoring intelligence activities. Project X, which was approved by the then Minister of Security and the Chief of Gendarmerie, consisted of a database containing information about social, environmental, and human rights organizations, as well as associations related to social movements, unions, and victims of the dictatorship.

The police officers worked undercover at demonstrations and protests attended by organizations opposed to the government. Project X violated the above-mentioned Law on National Intelligence, which prevents security forces from producing intelligence or storing data about the political opinions of people, or their membership of social, union, political or community organizations.

It is currently being investigated whether the activities conducted by National Police were illegal. This case is still in the preliminary investigation stage. Thanks to a German parliamentarian's request to access information, it was revealed that Argentina bought electronic surveillance equipment from Germany. This illustrates the State's lack of transparency with regards to its surveillance activities, since, so far, the capabilities, purposes, and users of this equipment are still unknown.

We can infer that the Italian company presented its products to the public agencies in charge of intelligence activities. So far there has been no concrete information or official statements regarding these interactions. The most recent case regarding surveillance involves the death of Alberto Nisman, which occurred in January An investigation conducted by security expert, Morgan Marquis-Boire of The Intercept, indicated that Nisman had downloaded spy software malware on his cellphone shortly before his death.

However, because Nisman opened the file from his Android phone, his computer was not infected. Marquis-Boire adds that this attack was not an isolated event, and that the person or persons responsible for this surveillance attempt have also conducted operations in various locations in South America on other subjects, like journalist Jorge Lanata.

The aftermath of the prosecutor's death forced the Argentinian intelligence services into the spotlight and to engage in public debate. The project paved the way for the aforementioned changes regarding surveillance: the dissolution of the Intelligence Secretariat, the creation of the Federal Intelligence Agency, the transfer of wiretaps to the Public Prosecutor's Office. This Principle establishes that any limitation to human rights must be prescribed by law and meet a standard of clarity and precision that is sufficient to ensure that individuals have advance notice of and can foresee its application.

Telecommunications surveillance in the criminal and intelligence fields must be conducted in accordance with the national constitution, the human rights treaties to which Argentina has subscribed, and with the provisions in the relevant laws and codes. Both normative bodies describe the procedures for conducting communications surveillance and identify the officials that may authorize them.

In that sense, they comply with the requirement of legality. Notwithstanding, the regulatory framework on intelligence includes some definitions that are vaguely defined, which can result in abuse by the State. The same vagueness and lack of precise definitions can be found in the new doctrine on intelligence matters. This new doctrine was created from an Executive Branch decree and so it was not discussed in Congress or publicly debated.

It elaborates on what constitutes an attacks against the constitutional order, which might be legally problematic since it is not clearly defined. The same lack of precision can be seen regarding intelligence activities in the investigation of fraudulent use or illegal disclosure of contents. The current regulation on telecommunications also includes vague language that could unintentionally allow for communications surveillance. On the other hand, it lays down the inviolability of communications held by telecommunications networks or services.

And it indicates that communications interception, as well as its subsequent storage and analysis, may only be conducted with request of a competent judge. However, other articles establish obligations for ICT service users that might be at odds with this premise and the Principle of Legality. Because this resolution is very broad, it may be problematic for the Principle of Legality. The same applies to Law 25, on Mobile Communications Services. This law compels mobile service providers to collect, retain, and disclose personal data without clearly delineating the limits to or purposes of the collection, or the type of data being collected.

The fact that these regulations are not clear—that they are too broad and lack precision—leaves room for potential abuse by authorities which conflicts with the international standards on privacy. Laws should only permit Communications Surveillance by specified State authorities to achieve a legitimate aim that corresponds to a predominantly important legal interest that is necessary in a democratic society. Any measure must not be applied in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

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In principle, the Argentinian law that provides for the interception of communications complies with this requirement, since it establishes that interceptions must be conducted in exceptional circumstances, with an aim to prove the commission of a crime or to protect national defense and domestic security. However, as we have analyzed, the new framework that regulates intelligence activities in Argentina extends the list of offenses that could be considered at odds with institutional order and democratic practices.

As such, it could be subjected to intelligence activities. This could trigger new State practices that are dangerous to human rights and challenge the Principle of Legitimate Aim. With regards to the telecommunications framework, the requirement that service providers must retain information is not duly justified. Similarly, telecommunications legislation does not comply with this principle.

The new systems for data collection analyzed in this report, like the SUBE, SIBIOS, and the DNI, which all originated from prior legislation and were not publicly discussed, do not abide by this principle, as their aims are not duly justified. With the broad idea of providing more security, preventing crime, and simplifying paperwork, biometric and biographic data and information about the citizens' daily movements and routines are being collected with very little transparency. This happens despite the fact that personal data and intelligence legislation do not allow agencies to obtain information, produce intelligence, or store people's data on the basis of race, religion, and political opinions or activities.

However Project X included practices that were implemented by the Argentinian security forces and in conflict with this provision. Surveillance laws, regulations, activities, powers, or authorities must be limited to those which are strictly and demonstrably necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. This means that Communications Surveillance must only be conducted when it is the only means of achieving a legitimate aim, or, when it is the means least likely to infringe upon human rights. The criminal procedure for communications interception establishes the exceptional nature of communications interception, as well as the judge's duty in making sure that the interception request complies with the Principle of Legality and Reasonableness.

In this regard, this does not comply with this principle. Notwithstanding, the intelligence framework establishes provisions linked to this principle, since communications surveillance may only be carried out with a written judicial order describing in detail the phone numbers or e-mail addresses that are going to be intercepted or recorded.

The legal framework for telecommunications abides by the Principle of Necessity as it highlights the concept of the inviolability of communications and that surveillance may only be carried out with a judicial order. Any instance of Communications Surveillance authorized by law must be appropriate to fulfill the specific Legitimate Aim identified. Communications surveillance conducted through the criminal process must demonstrate that the interception is useful in determining that a crime has been committed.

Moreover, intelligence regulations comply with the Principle of Adequacy by establishing that any data collected through intelligence activities that is unrelated to the aims set out in the regulatory framework must be destroyed. This law further establishes that information may not be stored on the basis of race, religion, private actions, political activities, and membership of social organizations, among others.

Telecommunications legislation, as we have previously seen, does not completely comply with this principle, since it does not establish a maximum time period for personal data retention. It also must be stored in a way that it can be destroyed when the data becomes unnecessary or irrelevant to the aims for which they were first collected. In order for communications surveillance to be proportional, it is necessary for the State to establish certain requisites to a competent judicial authority, prior to conducting communications surveillance:.

There is a high degree of probability that a serious crime or specific threat to a Legitimate Aim has been or will be carried out. This requisite is not met in the criminal legislation, as it solely requires that interception be useful to ascertain that a crime has been committed, without specifications regarding the severity of the crime.

For intelligence activities, national intelligence bodies must seek judicial authorization to intercept communications in order to investigate risks to domestic security and national defense, or complex federal crimes, like drug trafficking. There is a high degree of probability that evidence of relevant and material to such a serious crime or specific threat to a Legitimate Aim would be obtained by accessing the Protected Information sought.

This requisite is neither met in the criminal process nor in the framework that regulates intelligence activities. In Argentina, the regulatory framework on intelligence activities is mainly established by Law 25, on National Intelligence of 42 and Law 27,, which modifies the former in many substantial ways. Law 27,, which was passed in , modifies several aspects of the previous regulation and basically dissolves the agency in charge of intelligence activities and replaces it with the Federal Intelligence Agency AFI, in Spanish.

According to this regulatory framework, intelligence agencies must conduct their activities in line with what is established in the national constitution and the above-mentioned treaties on human rights ratified by Argentina. On the other hand, the law on internal security does not include the armed forces engaged in internal security activities. An exception arises in situations in which the executive branch determines that a certain threat cannot be combatted by internal security forces such as the federal police, the provincial police, the national gendarmerie, etc.

Moreover, this law regulates the intelligence activities conducted by security and police forces. As noted above, the current regulatory framework indicates that operating intelligence systems in Argentina must strictly adhere to the provisions listed in the national constitution and in the regulations and laws in force. They shall not assume functions in criminal investigations, unless a competent judicial authority issues a specific and justified request for them to do so in a particular case within their jurisdiction, 55 or unless they are authorized by law.

In this case, all the pertaining procedural rules shall apply to them. With the modifications introduced by Law 27,, the legislative framework establishes that the highest authorities of each agency in the intelligence system must be the ones to order these activities. The Argentinian legislative framework in intelligence matters establishes that the interception and seizure of private communications may only be requested by judicial authorization.

Although we will expand on this in later sections, it is necessary to mention a significant shifting of authority that was part of the reform of the national intelligence system. Previously the Department of Judicial Interceptions was the only Argentinian State body permitted to intercept and seize communications. The Argentinian legal framework stipulates that intelligence agencies must conduct their activities in accordance with is the terms established by the Personal Data Protection Law, 62 which is analyzed further below. The revelation or dissemination of the information obtained by intelligence agencies requires, without any exception whatsoever, a judicial order or authorization, as stated above.

The law on national intelligence makes reference to the databases stored by the agencies that make up the Argentinian intelligence system. The legislation further establishes that these data protection banks must monitor information flow in order to guarantee their constitutionality and legality. Any data that is obtained through illegal intelligence activities must be destroyed.

Moreover, these data protection banks must guarantee that no information is stored on the basis of race, religious beliefs, private actions, political activities, and membership of social organizations, among others. As previously stated, the law punishes those who are involved in intelligence activities and unlawfully intercept, seize, or divert communications that are not addressed to them. In , Argentina's intelligence system was reformed. This new doctrine intends to reform and modernize the National Intelligence System. The attacks against constitutional order are clearly described in the constitution and the executive branch should not try to expand them by regulatory means.

It should be noted that many of the definitions in the doctrine are vague. For instance, the document does not clearly define cybersecurity, which is a problem given that this concept is complex and discussed in global debates on Internet regulation and governance. All these issues might be dangerous when it comes to surveillance and the exercise of fundamental rights online. The law was passed after a very short debate in Congress, which was held with little participation from stakeholders in this key sector.

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Interception, and its subsequent registering and analysis may only be conducted with judicial approval. The law also lists obligations of those who use information and communication technology services. Some civil society organizations noted that the article's vague wording could pose a risk to users' privacy and go against the articles in the national constitution, which, as stated above, establish the inviolability of the home.


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The other set of regulations that should be taken into account is the Regulations on the Quality of Telecommunications Services, which was drafted in by the Department of Communications. We analyze the problems that these regulations could have with regard to surveillance in the data retention section.

Even though there is no implementing regulation for Law This law establishes a register of mobile telephone users. Its' purpose? To detect illegal activities conducted on those devices. This legislation goes against the regulations on personal data, since mobile telephone service providers are compelled to collect, retain, and disclose personal data without any limits or objectives established by law. As previously stated, the law does not set a maximum time period for personal data retention nor does it protect against providers who may use the data for reasons that differ from the original purpose of the collection.

There is no legislation establishing mandatory data retention periods for Internet service providers in Argentina. However, there are some points worth considering in the aforementioned Regulations on the Quality of Telecommunications Services. These regulations were drafted by the Department of Communications. Pursuant to these regulations, telecommunications service providers must give the recently-created ENACOM free access to their service equipment and systems and deliver any information that ENACOM requests by deadlines set by this body.

Even though the resolution further indicates that the quality measurement of the service must be conducted in accordance with personal data protection laws, 94 these articles are, to say the least, confusing, and could result in the unlawful use of user data. Regarding data retention, Article 8 in the regulations requires telecommunications service providers to keep all of the data collected by their systems electronically for at least three years so that it may be used for quality assurance purposes established by this law.

Rules for searches vary from province to province because the procedural codes are decided by individual jurisdictions. We will next examine the procedures outlined in the National Criminal Procedure Code, which is applicable only to federal crimes. Whenever there is a reasonable belief that evidence related to an investigation or a suspect related to a crime may be found in a certain place, upon the request, a judge shall order the search of that place, based on a properly-substantiated decision. The search may be carried out in person by the judge or—if the judge so decides it—by a representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, by an official duly appointed by the judge, or by the police or any other security force that the judge deems appropriate.

As a general rule, searches must be conducted during daylight hours. However, exigent circumstances may allow investigators to conduct the search at any time of day, as long as the extraordinary circumstances are outlined in the search warrant. The judge shall ensure that formal requisites are met and that the justification for the warrant is well-founded.

In serious or emergency cases, the investigator conducting the search can be notified by electronic means or any other adequate means, provided that the communication method used and the identification of the recipient are properly indicated. If the request was made by telephone, the judge shall require the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office meet certain requisites.

A copy of the search warrant shall be delivered to those who reside in or occupy the place where the search will be conducted. When the residents are absent, the warrant shall be delivered to the superintendent or to any person of legal age on the premises, preferably a relative of the resident.

The official in charge of the search must identify themselves before the person being notified and invite the resident or occupant to be present during the search. If no person can be found on the premises, that fact must be placed on record. The person s conducting the search should ensure the right to privacy is as minimally restricted as possible. If, while conducting the search, other objects are found that could serve as evidence for the commission of a crime different from the evidence that prompted the search in the first place, the judge or the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office shall be notified and decide whether it is appropriate for these objects to be seized.

There should be a description of the searched property—and the way in which the seized objects were found—on record signed by the participants of the search. The right of Habeas Data and the protection of personal data are, as stated before, enshrined in Article 43 of the national constitution. The protection of personal data is regulated in Law 25, This law aims to comprehensively protect personal data that is kept in public and private databases.

Its purpose is to guarantee the right to dignity and privacy, as well as a person's right to access any personal data the companies have stored on them. Article 4 indicates that data must be stored in such a way that allows the data subject to access it. Data must be destroyed as soon as it becomes unnecessary or irrelevant to the purposes for which it was collected. Law 25, prohibits the treatment and handing over of personal data to third parties by the data controller without the subject's consent.

Article 11 prohibits the handing over of data to third parties without the consent of its subject. Nonetheless, this consent requirement may be bypassed when data is collected for purposes relative to the State's powers and functions or when the data is shared directly between departments within the State's bodies in the performance of their duties.

The personal data law allows the State to manage and share data without the owner's consent through general-term exceptions drafted within the law. This may result in the deprivation of citizens' main data privacy protections. The other issue concerning the Argentinian policy framework on personal data involves how the law is enforced. Argentina is a pioneer when it comes to policies regarding biometrics, which are techniques that allow for the automatic recognition of individuals on the basis of behavioral and physical characteristics.

Several human rights organizations have studied the trajectory of personal data collection, storage, and usage. This includes lack of information about what kind of data is collected, the purposes for collecting the data, how long the data is stored, what kind of analysis is conducted on the data, who has access to the data, and how the data is stored. These concerns are similar to the ones listed in previous sections about the law on personal data in Argentina and its two drawbacks: i that consent is not necessary when personal data is collected for the State's functions or legal obligation and ii that it enables several public agencies to exchange personal data.

In the last few years, sensitive data has been inappropriately used and published without authorization and with a purpose different from the one required, which is in conflict with the law on personal data. By law, every citizen and foreign resident must have a DNI—which includes biometric data, such as a photo and a thumb fingerprint.

The current DNI is produced using new computer technologies: biometric data and databases for fingerprints, and computer tools for fingerprint verification. By issuing a card that contains personal data, this system can record all the trips of its users and create a database controlled by the National Department of Transport. Among the many problems that can arise from such a system, personal data related to trips made by users is accessible to anyone with the card's number.

For instance, by entering the card number in the official SUBE website—which does not require a password—anyone can access the trip record made by the user of that card. This would not align with the provisions of the law of personal data. In fact, this system has already proven itself vulnerable when it comes to the protection of the citizens' personal information.


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  5. The national identity document is now key to criminal policies in Argentina. In December the system had already registered 13,2 million fingerprints. The DNPDP recently published a series of regulatory standards and some of them are related to surveillance. This provision regulates, in particular, the capabilities of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UAVs or drones to collect information.

    Article 2 of this provision, related to data collected by drones, stipulates that, to ensure the right to privacy is not adversely impacted, the collected data is proportionate, relevant, and strictly necessary to the aim for which it is being collected. Also, it adds, that in order to comply with personal data regulations, those responsible for managing or collecting the data must implement a policy on personal data management and privacy and describe, among other things, the purpose of the collection, how long the data will be retained, and the technical mechanisms employed to ensure its security and confidentiality.

    This provision also establishes that certain precautions must be taken in order to avoid collecting sensitive information, such as personal information obtained from health institutions, religious facilities, and political or union demonstrations. The Argentinian State has increasingly been using security cameras within the country. Nationwide, the DNPDP provision establishes the conditions under which the collection and management of digital images for the purpose of security are legal. Article 1 of the DNPDP follows the provisions in the personal data protection law by indicating that the collection of digital images through security cameras shall be legal with the consent of the subject being recorded.

    However, there are loopholes in this provision. In other words, prior consent is not necessary when the data collection is conducted by an event host or by the State in accordance with its functions. Consent is also not required when the data is collected on private property—including spaces that are rented or leased. Article 2 stipulates that collected images may not be used for any other reason than the originally stated purpose. The provision also establishes that images that are captured in violation of individuals rights must be purged upon request of the individual whose data was collected.

    Those in charge of collecting and managing digital images for purposes of security must implement a privacy and personal data management policy. The policy must establish a retention period for images, and instructions for purging the data after the period has elapsed. Similar to the information obtained by drones, the databases that store personal data collected by security cameras must be registered with the National Registry of Data.

    The National Department of Personal Data establishes a guide of rules for the protection of personal data in the development of applications by enforcing privacy policies during app development. The guide emphasizes that people have the right to control how their personal information is used. Section 2 references the principles of privacy and indicates that data management can only be legal if the data subject has given consent—unless, of course, one of the aforementioned exceptions provided for in the regulatory framework is applicable.

    This guide urges app developers to be transparent about how they use data and to build their apps with privacy by design and privacy by default in mind. It also urges them to establish clear privacy policies. Similar to the provisions mentioned above, this guide establishes that the collected data may only be used in accordance with the aim for which it was obtained.

    Such data must be strictly relevant to the purpose that prompted its collection, and it may not be obtained via unfair or illegal means. Finally, the data must be destroyed when it becomes irrelevant. Modifications to the Telecommunications Law were passed in These articles were initially regulated by a decree, which was suspended a year later.

    Attorney Ernesto Halabi filed an amparo action, arguing that these three articles were unconstitutional on the grounds that they violated the right to privacy and made it impossible for him to guarantee his clients professional secrecy. The case worked its way up to the Supreme Court which ultimately ruled that communications data transmitted by appropriate means is protected under personal privacy.

    Such communications data is covered by the constitutional provisions that protect privacy and establish the inviolability of home, and also by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man. The Supreme Court then maintained that intrusions into the private lives of individuals are only justified when they are provided for by law—and as long as there is a greater interest in protecting individual freedoms, social defense, public morals, or fighting crime.

    The Court referenced prior judgments in which a breach of the inviolability of correspondence would have been acceptable:. The Court considered that the articles in question did not meet the above-mentioned requirements. The articles failed to describe the cases or circumstances in which interceptions could be conducted, and did not provide for a specific system that would protect communications.

    Argentina has adopted a federal-type government structure, which means more than one territorial center has the capacity to adopt laws. The unity of the State is balanced by the plurality and autonomy of the provinces. Nonetheless, it establishes that, depending on the jurisdictions to which cases or individuals belong, either the federal or provincial courts are responsible for enforcing it. The goal is to maintain unity and consistency, and at the same time, respect the autonomy of each province to delineate procedural codes for the implementation of substantive law.

    This means that the Criminal Code is enacted by the National Congress and applied throughout the country. Provinces cannot issue their own criminal codes, however procedural codes are promulgated by each jurisdiction. This makes it difficult to describe all of the actors and bodies involved in criminal prosecutions in Argentina and also to outline a procedural diagram for communications interception since both vary according to jurisdiction.

    Thus, we look to the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure as an example, which applies to crimes under federal jurisdiction, since many provincial regulations follow the regulations in the federal code. Jurisdictional Bodies: Public Prosecutor's Office: The National Criminal Procedure Code establishes the following steps for communications interception:.

    It may occasionally request communications surveillance in connection with complex federal crimes related to terrorism, cybercrime, drugs, arms, and human trafficking, etc. It may also do so for crimes against economic and financial public order and crimes against public authorities and constitutional order. It has its own means of collection.

    This process is explained further below. The AFI is the highest intelligence authority in Argentina and it controls the other agencies that make it up. According to the New Doctrine of National Intelligence, which is the recent legislation that provides for Law 27, and delineates issues related to intelligence, the AFI's functions are as follows:. In order to intercept private communications, the AFI must request judicial authorization. The director general of the AFI, or another official shall request the judicial authorization from a federal judge with jurisdictional authority.

    The jurisdiction is defined according to the address of the person s whose communications are to be intercepted or by the place where they are held in the case of mobile or satellite communications. Authorization to intercept communications shall be granted for a period no longer than 60 days, which shall automatically lapse, unless the director or appointed official formally requests that the period be prolonged for an additional 60 days as long as it is absolutely required in order to complete the investigation.

    Once these terms have lapsed, the judge shall initiate the appropriate proceedings or, alternatively, order the destruction of all the elements that were intercepted. When Law 27, was adopted, the former Department of Judicial Interceptions DOJ, in Spanish —which was the only State body in charge of conducting communications interceptions or seizures—was transferred to the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry an independent body that has operational and financial autonomy.



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